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ACCOUNTABILITY OF CHARITABLE TRUSTS
ELEAkOR K. TAYLOR.
THE ISSUE OF SUPERVISION
Over a century ago Stephen Girard's bequest to establish a boarding
school for "poor, male, white qrphan children" wis upheld by the
Supreme Court.1 In the intervening years the restrictIons of Girard'i'
trust have been challenged several times.' Now once again his will has,
been contested.3 The recent Pennsylvania 'contest grew out of the
segregation issue when the City of Philadelphia and the Commonwealth
joined tvo negro applicants for admission -to Girard .College in petitioi-.
ing for a citation on the Board of Directors of City Trusts to show why,
the applicants should not be admitted. The Pennsylvania court approved
the refusal, the majority opinion maintaining that Girard had the Iright
to limit his bequest' and that the City of Philadelphia in holding the
trust was acting only in a fiduciary capacity limited'to the same rights as
any individual or trust company acting as trustee.' Subsequently 'the
United States Supreme Court -has reversed the Pennsylvania decision,
upholding the dissenting opinion that the Girard trust is now within the
orbit of the Fourteenth Amendment and that nb testator had the right'
to ask government to do something prohibited by the Constitution.'
Although the issue of court protection comes in a new guise today,
the Girard case points up the problems inherent in. charitable giving'
The complications resulting from the divorcing of the ownership of
property from its use have lain back of the slow acceptance of trusi
enforcement.' When the law upheld the rights of the donor to 'create
a trust and to impose whatever duties he chose to exact and the trustee'
would accept, it made the instrument itself goverfi alike the duties of
the trustee and the rights of the beneficiary.8 'Its terms must therefore
clearly designate the beneficiary and specify the duration of the life of
the trust. Because the law made the trustee aiiswerable to the terms
of the trust, loyal to the interests of the beneficiary, prudent in his acts
and decisions, he was permitted to seek instruction from the court and
be protected from personal liability where he carried out its instructions."
* Associate Professor, School of Social Work, University of Iowa.
1 Vidal v. Girard's Executors, 43 U. S. (2 How.) 127 (1844).
2 Changing emphasis in the field of child care led to efforts to break the
will in the '30's. See Bradway, "New Uses of Wealth as Endowment," 151 Annals
185 (1930).
3 1n re Girard's Estate, 127 A. 2d 287 (Pa. 1956).
4 d. at 288.
5 ld. at 293.
625 U.S. L. WEExK 3316 (U.S. Apr. 29, 1957), sub nom. Pennsylvania v.
Board of Directors of City Trusts.
7 Holmes, Early English Equity, 1 L. Q. Rev. 162 (1885).
8 3 Bogert, Trusts and Trustees, §551.
9 3 Scott, Trusts §394 (1939).
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More importantly, however, for enforcement purposes, the beneficiary
could lay claim to the benefits of the trust, and his material self-interest
could be counted upon to provide the motive and energy to make the
private trust readily enforceable.
10
The privileges granted and the responsibilities exacted in the case
of the charitable trust differ from those in the case of the private trust.
Since the donor wishes to give to social uses, his gift must have approval
as one beneficial to the community. The catalogue of approved objects
has been an ever expanding one. 1 What benefits the community may
seem capable of curious construction when the House of Lords upholds
oyster dredging as contributing to community well-being or a gift can
be reported from Olathe, Kansas, providing a Christmas dinner for
horses, but the courts have been tolerant of minority opinion and eccentric
views.
Most of these special purpose funds represent an extension of earlier
objects that gained approval centuries ago, familiar gifts for the relief
of poverty, for the furtherance of religion and education. Conflicting
views as to what constitutes community benefit have been supported.
Trusts to promote peace by disarmament are equally charitable with
trusts to prevent war by preparedness. Similarly, the courts do not rule
against views on the grounds that the majority of the public would
disagree. 2 The fact that a theory has few adherents will not in-
validate its acceptance for purposes of charitable giving. These gifts
are valid precisely because they are gifts to minority opinion and thought
worthy of encouragement in a free society.
The fact that charitable gifts serve social ends has another im-
portant consequence. The gift must reach beyond the donor or the
specific individuals who may be helped by it to society as a whole.
While the courts of-ten talk of individuals who are to get
charitable benefits as 'beneficiaries,' strictly speaking the state
is the only party having a legal interest in enforcement, and
the human beings who are favorably affected by the execution
of the trust are merely the media through whom the social
advantages flow to the public. If a trust has as its object the
care of the poor, those persons who are chosen to secure the
necessities of life under it are not in reality beneficiaries of the
trust but only the instrumentalities through which the state re-
ceives the social advantage of seeing that its citizens do not
suffer want.
1 3
10 2 Scott, Trusts, §200 (1956).
1 1 Zollman, American Law of Charities, 126 (1924). By 1833 the 21 ad-
missible objects enumerated in the Elizabethan Statute had been extended to 46
purposes. (43 Eliz. c. 4) (1601).
12 2 Restatement, Trusts, §374 (1935).
13 Bogert, "Proposed Legislation Regarding State Supervision of Charities,"
52 Mich. L. Rev. 633 (1954). For extended discussion see 2A Bogert, Trusts and
Trustees, §361 (1953).
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Because the law has attempted to measure the intangibles of social
gains by testing the disinterestedness of a gift in terms of a benefit to a
shifting or anonymous group, gifts to these "indefinite beneficiaries"
escape some of the limits applying to private trusts-they are on-going
or made "in perpetuity", 14 and usually not subject to the bans on ac-
cumulations which affect ordinary property holdings.15 Recognition of
the possibility of out-moded trusts likely to result from changing cir-
cumstances has also modified the ways in which the trust instrument
governs the duties of the trustees. The court may exercise cy pres
powers"' to reapply the gift to current objects paralleling the original
bequest.
One of the most substantial privileges accorded the charitable gift
is exemption from taxation.17 Such freedom from the ordinary rules of
giving amounts to an actual subsidy. The value of the gift is augmented
by indirect giving on the part of the state itself.
The privileges extended to charity are based on the assumption that
philanthropy contributes to the state. The rights to be protected are
social rights and government protects them. Supervision of the charitable
trust is the responsibility of a state official, usually the attorney general.'
The social consequences of charitable giving have made the question
of accountability a basic one. Tests of the charitable quality of a gift in
terms of loyalty to the common good are difficult to apply. Back of
the accumulated law is the basic assumption that no one must profit from
it. Both the donor's right to give and the beneficiaries' right to receive
are seen as incidental to intangibles of community well-being resulting
from the gift. Although the courts have been liberal in interpreting
what is a valid charitable purpose, and have evaded the quicksand of
trying to make motives in themselves decisive, 1 9 they have been strict in
differentiating between profit making and charitable activities. The test
is, of course, most evident in tax exemption.
The cliche stolen from Brutus' speech in Julius Caesar is especially
apppropriate to gifts in perpetuity which though good in one age may
become the evils of another. Adaption has been made through constant
expanding of the catalogue of approved purposes and the development
of the cy pres doctrine for correcting the donor's mistakes in not out-
guessing the future.2" But whether focused on the donor at the point
143 Scott, Trusts, §365 (1939). Note exceptions.
153 id. §401.9 (1939).
162A Bogert, Trusts and Trustees, §431 (1953).
17 2A id. §361 (1953).
I 8 2A id. §411 (1953) ; 4 Scott, Trusts, §391 (1956).
194 Scott, Trusts, §343 (1956). As Scott points out regarding the famous
contest between Binney and Webster the court was not even concerned with the
question of whether Girard's motive was to help his neighbors or spite his heirs
but the use to which his property was to be put.
20 See Hobhouse, The Dead Hand, 63 (1880) ; Beveridge, Voluntary Action,
360 (1948).
The development of a special device known as the "community trust" has
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of gift making, the trustee as holder of the gift, or the beneiiciary
through whom social gains are realized, the transfer of private gifts
to public uses comes under governmental supervision.
GOVERNMENTAL HEARINGS AS AN INDEX OF TRENDS
Governmental hearings have been a sounding board for public con-
cern with the problem of regulation. Although the arguments may be
distorted somewhat, they are a fair index to the issues which have cap-
tured attention. In England the Brougham Commission climaxed legis-
lative reforms dating back to Tudor times."1 This marathon investiga-
tion which ran for nineteen years and ended in a thirty-seven volume
report, resulted in the Charitable Trust Act in 1853.2 The legislation
sanctioned the setting up of a separate administrative board, provided for
reporting measures expected to create a national registry of trusts, and
semi-judicial powers to modify court machinery in dealing with out-
moded trusts. Recently, the Nathan Committee 3 reviewed the work of
the Commission and urged changes in the substantive law to allow for a
more flexible definition of "charity", 2 4 relaxation of the cy pres doc-
trine, 5 and administrative changes affecting board reorganization. 6
Compulsory reporting was also urged.2 The Committee summed up
the problem of the multiplicity of small trusts by pointing out that there
were over 110,000 trusts known to the Commissioners and the Ministry
of Education of which a fourth were more than a hundred years old
and a third not valued at more than £25. Some 80,000 were still tied
to special purpose funds for the sick and needy, and most of the new
ones have followed this traditional pattern. 28
American arguments about control have been conditioned by the
fact that foundations are a comparatively recent development and have
characteristically taken the corporate form.29 It is the possibility of abuse
provided a kind of auxiliary method for balancing the contradictory demands
of a trust instrument and a purpose no longer regarded as socially useful. In
selecting a trustee the donor may set up an individual fund or series of funds in
a given bank or trust company. Furthermore, he may allow discretionary au-
thority to merge his gifts with those of others in a composite or general fund.
The community trust attempts to solve three problems often encountered in the
making of a charitable gift: It anticipates future contingencies. It provides
responsible financial management. It encourages informed community participa-
tion. The community trust may be regarded as a device for anticipating some
of the problems with which regulation is presumed to deal.
21 Kenny, Endowed Charities, 134 (1880).
22 16 and 17 Vic., c. 137 (1853).
2 3 Report of the Committee on the Law and Practice Relating to Charitable
Trusts, Nathan Committee Report. Cmd. 8710.
24 Id. at 36.
25 d. at 91.
26d. at 100.
2 7 Id. at 44.
2 8 d. at 27.
29 Andrews, Philanthropic Foundations, 45 (1956).
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through the latitude of broadly phrased charter purposes, the hierarchical
nature of donor dominated boards, and the directive force of conditional
grants which have preoccupied American investigative groups. Different
aspects of these problems are evident in the successive hearings. Early
in the century the Senate Commission on Industrial Relations" investi-
gated the foundations as a part of its inquiry into the industrial activities
of their founders. The carrying over of business methods and philoso-
phy to philanthropic giving was interpreted as a further extension of the
control of the big corporations and a dangerous "benevolent absolutism."'"
National regulation was advocated through the substitution of public
social services for private charities and federal chartering limiting
foundations to a single purpose, putting a ceiling on expenditures, and
requiring public reporting.
3 2
The second series of hearings came during the period surrounding
World War II. Although again focused on the possible perversion of
charity by the donor, the investigations into foundation activities in the
Forties33 were notable for their attack on "masqueraders." 3t Again re-
porting and registry measures were urged, but these were emphasized as
appropriate tax measures" or the extension of existing state machinery
to help protect the bona fide charitable organization.36
The Cox" and Reece3" hearings reflected the peculiar fears grow-
ing out of the cold war. Concern with the dangers of Communist in-
filtration in American life lay back of these investigations of the role of
the foundation in underwriting education and research and the extent to
which their funds had been perverted to "un-American and subversive
activities." But agairn the basic question of corporate form came up for
discussion. The presumption that the foundations had been "taken over"
by Communists had its origin in the recognition of the nature of relation-
ships between board and staff and the separation of managerial functions
from policy making. In another sense the hearings were directed at the
beneficiaries for the research reports were challenged as propaganda for
leftist thinking.3
9
3DIndustrial Relations S. Doe. No. 415, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. (1916).
31 Id. at Vol. VIII, 7664, 7919.
32 d. at Vol. I, 85.
33Hearings before Subcommittee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce,
Closing of Nashua, N. H., Mills, of the Senate, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (1948).
34 See Chambers; Charters of Philanthropies, 6 (1948).
35 Hearings before Committee on Ways and Means of the House, Pt. V., 77th
Cong., 2d Sess. vol. 1, rev. 89 (1942). 5 Id. Revenue Code Revision at 3411 (1948).
30 Report of Special Committee to Study the Laws of This State with Respect
to and Governing Charitable Trusts, So-Called, 6 (1950).
37 Hearings Before Select (Cox) Committee to Investigate Tax Exempt
Foundations and Comparable Organizations (House), 82nd Cong., 2d Sess. (1953).
38 Hearings Before the Special (Reece) Committee, House Report No. 2681,
83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954).
39 Cox Hearings, infra note 52. at 7. Reece Hearings, supra, note 38, at 472.
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As Keele has wisely remarked the significance of governmental
attitudes toward foundations is best understood in terms of the freedom
accorded them.
There could have been imposed upon foundations rigid re-
strictions as to the method of their creation and their legal
form; the amount of their permissible assets; their purposes;
the right of perpetuity; the number and type of trustees, the
length of time they could serve, the method of their election
and the amount of their remuneration. There could have been
imposed supervision by governmental bodies and participation
in management by governmental officials, which could, and
almost to a certainty, would have meant actual control by
government. And lastly, there could have been heavy and
even ruinous taxation. The nonexistence of such measures is
as significant in determining the attitude of government as the
existence of the applicable laws, and, indeed, it is only when
we view both the positive and the negative aspects of appli-
cable law that we get the matter in proper perspective. 40
In this regard the findings of the Rhode Island4  investigative
group are important. In contrast to the four national hearings which
have been focused on the overall role of the foundation in American
life, these hearings were subordinated to the specific task of reporting
on the existing law governing trusts. The two recent hearings in
California42 and New York43 have also concerned themselves with
state machinery.
STATE MACHINERY FOR TRUST SUPERVISION
There have been significant changes in state legislation within the
past decade. To appreciate the full force of this movement the pre-
vailing machinery for trust enforcement needs to be considered. Al-
though the testamentary trust is subject to the statutes applying to wills,
and registry of such gifts is incidental to settling an estate, identifying
information is scattered about through numerous courts having juris-
diction. An inter vivos trust may be created by conveyance, deed, or
declaration of trust. Its existence may be known only to the parties
concerned, the donor, the lawyer drawing up such an agreement, and
possibly the tax authorities. Under the circumstances challenge to such
a gift is unlikely.
Not only may a trust come about without being identified, but
when its existence is known, there is limited provision for supervision
over trustees. A majority of jurisdictions require reports from testa-
40Keele, "Government's Altitude Towards Foundations," 33 Mich. State
Bar J., 15 (Oct., 1954).
41 Report of Special Committee, supra, note 36, at 13-15.
42 Cal. Senate Interim Judiciary Committee, Second Progress Report, Senator
Bush, Chairman (1953).
43 Report of Joint Legislative Committee on Charitable and Philanthropic
Agencies and Organizations. Leg. Doe. No. 26 (1954).
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mentary trustees of trusts, others have statutes applying to all trustees,
but except for those states which have recently adopted trust registries,
few require systematic reporting by charitable trustees.
Indiana,44 Wisconsin,4" and North Carolina4 6 have comprehensive
statutes exacting reporting. Yet Indiana officials rely rather on the in-
formal notification from trustees about proceedings or duplicates sent by
them of court reports.47 In North Carolina the clerk of the superior
court is specifically charged with the responsibility for notifying the
attorney general of the failure of a trustee to report. Yet inquiry
48
suggests no action has been brought as a result of the clerk's notification
and question as to whether more than a few reports had been filed. In
Wisconsin action was based on court reports in only two cases.49 The
comments from this state are particularly revealing because of the
statute widening the definition of "interested party."
Enforcement of Public Trust: 1) An action may be
brought by the attorney general in the name of the state, upon
his own information, or upon the complaint of any interested
party for the enforcement of a public charitable trust. 2) Such
action may be brought in the name of the state by any 10 or
more interested parties on their own complaint, when the at-
torney general refuses to act. 3) The term "interested party"
herein shall comprise a donor to the trust or a member or
prospective member of the class for the benefit of which the
trust was established.50
This legislation is reminiscent of the English legislation which attempts
to encourage bringing information regarding trust abuses to the attention
of authorities. Yet reliance on such devices seems to have been un-
realistic. Not only is the beneficiary likely to be ignorant of his presumed
benefits, but the involvements of such participation are formidable.
51
Although the conscientious trustee may follow through on his pre-
sumed duty, the evidence suggests that this is exceptional. A review of
Iowa court records in a populous county seems typical, not only in the
discovery that only one trustee had filed reports within the period ex-
tending over the last decade but in the clerk's attitude that this particular
trustee, a well known legal figure in the state, was being scrupulously in
character. Even the scrupulous trustee might be expected to overlook a
duty not made explicit. The frustrations of investigative groups trying
to get the simplest facts of identification about charitable organizations
44 Ind. Ann. Stat. §§31-712, 31-713 (Burns, 1953 Cur. Supp.).
45 Wis. Stat. §317-06 (1953).
4 6 N.C. Gen. Stat. 36-19 (1950).
47 Taylor, Public .ccountability of Foundations and Charitable Trusts, 37
(1953).
48 See 21 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 123 (1953).
49 Ibid.
5 OWis. Stat. §231.34 (1953).
51 2A Bogert, Trusts and Trustees, §§411-12 (1953).
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are a matter of record. The Cox Committee could not arrive at any
accurate figures about the numbers of foundations or their assets, and
the resulting recommended bill urged compulsory reporting.5 2 The re-
cent New York Joint Legislative Committee declared in its report:
The sparcity of the data on the activities of organized charity
tends to make this field a playground for the unscrupulous.
The Committee uncovered several instances where persons
with known criminal and racketeering records moved into the
business because there was no supervision.
53
Although directed at fund raising groups the findings of the Joint Com-
mittee suggest even more strongly the lack of supervision over trustees
who hold funds. The boiler room operator may succeed in mulcting
the public, but his methods have a way of uncovering him. The un-
authorized use of the names of presumed sponsors and the annoyance
of those solicited helped to stimulate the probe. When Bing Crosby's
and President Eisenhower's names are used without permission, the
organization comes to light. Perhaps the most revealing fact about the
inquiry was pointed up in the Committee's confession that it was easier
to prepare the questionnaire than to locate all agencies and organizations
to which they should be sent. Of the 900 names assembled, the Com-
mittee admitted that it had no way of knowing what percentage of
organizations was actually covered. 4
The extension of court powers through "visitation" has often been
regarded as providing for supervision. 55 Traditionally the right was
presumed to be lodged in the donor as a condition of giving. But this
right of the donor which passed from him to his heirs or might be
assigned to a board of visitors is infrequently used in America. Such
active supervision is uncongenial to a court system which keeps adminis-
trative and judicial functions separated. Although analogous powers
have been granted boards over charitable institutions, these are char-
acteristically legislative grants to public officials charged with responsi-
bility over service programs. As Bogert has pointed out, the cases on
visitation are almost all concerned with absolute gifts to corporations
or gifts to corporations in trust and though there is some authority for
such powers with regard to private trustees for charity, the exact status
of the doctrine is not perfectly clear in modern American law.5 6
Perhaps the most important and subtle powers of the court in pro-
tecting charitable gifts is through the application of cy pres.17 When the
donor's particular purpose seems impractical or impossible to carry out,
the court may redirect the gift and save it from being lost. Although
52Final Report Select (Cox) Committee, House 2514, 14, Appendix A.
-
53 Leg. Report, supra, note 43, at 16.
54 Id. at 9.
55 Philips v. Bury, 2 Durnford and East 346, 352 (1788).
56Bogert, "Proposed Legislation Regarding State Supervision of Charities,"
52 Mich. L. Rev. 633 (1954).
5 2A Bogert, Trusts and Trustees, §431 (1953).
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American philanthropy has not suffered from the problem of outmoded
trusts in the same measure as has been the case in England, the sheer
passage of time may result in defeating a gift. There continues to be
some resistance to the application of the doctrine, but judicial and legis-
lative acceptance has paralleled the growth of private philanthropy."
In the more complex area of "general charitable intent" Pennsylvania
has attempted to solve the problem by a statute expressly abolishing the
distinction between "general" and "particular" intent. 9 It should be
remembered, however, that cy pres is only applied when other remedies
fail."° Furthermore, the steps by which the cy pres application comes
before the court are in themselves controlling and in this regard the role
of the attorney general is indispensable.
Investigations incidental to the establishment of trust registries in
Rhode Island6 and New Hampshire 2 and discussion and reports 3 pre-
ceeding the recent changes that have resulted in comparable legislation
in Ohio, South Carolina, and California reveal the difficulties under
which the attorney general labors in trying to carry out his duties. Action
taken at the national association in urging remedial legislation and the
adoption by the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the
American Bar Association of a uniform act 4 indicate a new trend.
The opinions of the officials themselves are of special interest be-
cause of their direct involvement in administration. In a follow up of
an earlier questionnaire6 5 the writer learned that legislative proposals
have been under consideration in ten states.6" In 1956 the uniform act
was proposed in Arizona but not voted out of committee. Two bills
were introduced in Indiana but failed of passage as did the ones in
Wyoming, Washington, Texas, and Pennsylvania. Efforts to introduce
the uniform act in Michigan two years ago met with such opposition
that no new attempts are likely soon. New Jersey has been reviewing
the matter, especially in view of the experience of the attorney general
in discovering trusts years after their creation. Oregon has legislation
under consideration, but matters are only at the discussion stage as is the
situation in Kentucky and Nebraska. An Illinois commission is now
working on the matter. In those states where no legislative action is
58 Fisch, The Cy Pres Doctrine in the United States, 115 (1950).
5)Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 20, §301.10 (1947).
C02 Restatement, Trusts, §399 (1935).
61 Report of R. L Special Committee, supra, note 36.
62 D'Amours "The Control of Charitable Trusts by the Attorney General"
Proceedings National Association of Attorneys General 98 (1946). Round Table:
Supervision of Charitable Trusts, Proceedings 156 (1953).
63 Taylor, supra, note 47, at 143.
64 Uniform Supervision of Trustees for Charitable Purposes Act.
65 Taylor, supra, note 47, at 143.
66Letters were addressed to all states and replies received from 47 juris-
dictions. The officials were asked specifically about whether the Uniform Act or
comparable legislation was under consideration. File available through Council of
State Government.
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under consideration comments reflect divergent opinion. One attorney
general expressed the belief that since trust enforcement is a duty laid
upon the attorney general, no legislative changes are necessary but
proper administrative adjustments appropriate to better office manage-
ment." Another official gave as his personal opinion that there must be
thousands of unidentified charitable trusts but did not wish to commit
himself on proposed legislation.
The experience in Texas has been fully reported by Attorney Gen-
eral Shepherd in the proceedings of the National Association of At-
torneys General6" and hints at the problem of opposition from special
interest groups. It is not clear what developments may take place there.
Failure to get legislation in Pennsylvania has led the attorney general
to try to work out special liaison measures with the local courts. In a
letter6 9 sent to each court he has requested that the judge have the clerk
prepare a list of existing charitable trusts, description of the purposes for
which it was established, and accounting details ordered by the court.
The Pennsylvania efforts are of particular pertinence because of
the modification of the common law duties of the attorney general under
the Estates Act." The progressive intent of this statute is obviously de-
feated where the attorney general had no knowledge of the need for his
assistance.
STATE SUPERVISION OF CHARITABLE CORPORATIONS
Although the basic machinery for trust supervision 7 lies with the
courts and the attorney general is the official usually charged with en-
forcement duties, other state officials may have a role in regulation. When
the foundation is organized as a non-profit corporation, the resulting
powers are a legislative grant, and the question of charter issuance, re-
porting, and revocation are crucial.
These statutes have special relevance in view of the fact that the
larger foundations take this form, that the entry into the philanthropic
field of the business corporation has intensified the trend, and that ap-
proximately three fourths of existing foundations are incorporated."
Although such important early foundations as the Smithsonian,
Rockefeller, Guggenheim, and Russell Sage were created by special
charter, foundations are typically chartered under the provisions of the
general corporation statutes.73 These provisions vary from jurisdiction
67 These unofficial opinions are not included in the letters on file.
6 SRound Table, Proceedings, 53.
69Letter from Deputy Attorney General Forer included in letter to writer
dated June 20, 1956.
70 Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 20, §301.10 (1954)
71 As Scott points out, ordinarily the rules which are applicable to a charita-
ble trust are applicable to a charitable corporation although some are not. 3 Scott,
Trusts, 348 (1939).
72 Andrews, Philanthropic Foundations, 45 (1956).
73 Taylor, supra, note 47, at 50 (1953).
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to jurisdiction. The two extremes are probably represented by Dela-
ware7 4 and New York." Delaware, despite its extensive business corpo-
ration laws, has no separate statutes applying to non-profit organizations
while New York has a series of some twelve different statutory provisions
covering various classes of corporations. Once classified, an organization
then becomes subject to the statutes applying to the general group to
which it belongs. The application of relevant law is more evident in
those states which specify listings of types of organizations such as
California, Illinois, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, and New York.
Under any circumstance the full force of the non-profit law can only
be evaluated when legislation affecting public welfare laws, charitable
donations and subscriptions, tax exemption, and similar measures are
reviewed.
The issuance of a charter is an important first step in the transfer
of private wealth to public uses. Yet in most states the declaration of
intention, the filing of forms, and the certification is almost a continuous
process. Ohio76 and Pennsylvania 77 statutes add the additional require-
ment that in the case of a corporation created in accordance with the
directives of a trust instrument the instrument be filed with the charter
application. Some legislation provides for public notice, such as the in-
clusion of the names of the incorporators in an official list or the lapse
of a stipulated number of days before the application can be approved.
But these provisions are part of the routine rather than a check on
chartering.
Additional safeguards exist in a few states. The approval of a
Supreme Court Justice is required in New York,7" and the court may
review the application in Pennsylvania.79 However, a search of citations
suggests that charters are rarely contested. The name of the organiza-
tion may rouse suspicion, the purposes may be so vague as to be question-
able, the possibility of tax evasion may stimulate review.
Recent comment by two Pennsylvania judges is suggestive. One
justice declared in reversing Master's decision based on suspicion directed
at the incorporators: "While the application for a charter may not be
subject to exactly the same rules as some other judicial proceedings, it is
subject to the fundamental one that persons before the court shall not be
condemned by a judge's findings without being given an opportunity to
be heard.""0 The other justice passing on a charter application about
which questions of tax evasion had arisen, pointed out that court review
74 Oleck, Non-Profit Corporations and Associations, 8 (1955).
75 1d. at 10.
76 Ohio Rev. Code §§1719.01-06 (Supp. 1956).
7 7 Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, §2S51-213 (1954).
78 N. Y. Membership Corp. Law, §10-11.
7 0 Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, §2S51-207 (1954).
80 Incorp. of Philadelphia Labor's Non-Partisan League, 328 Pa. 465, 196
At. 22 (1938).
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only occurred when there was evident violation of public policy. Warn-
ing of possible alteration by by-laws, he asserted that charter issuance
must be carefully weighed because the inherent right of such corpora-
tions to amend the original charter was "pregnant with potential evils."'"
Although most not-for-profit laws have some reporting provisions,
these important safeguards are dependent on basic identification. Col-
lection of such reports would necessarily depend on the existence of
some kind of file which in turn would depend on the explicitness of
obligation laid on the official and the administrative provisions for carry-
ing it out. The Illinois statute, for example, gives important interroga-
tory powers to the secretary of state.8 2 Failure to respond to his questions
is classified as a misdemeanor and subject to $100 fine. Failure to report
is ground for complaint proceedings to dissolve the corporation. Yet this
enforcement machinery intended by the drafters to provide adequate
regulation is dependent on information not collected in any central
place. The recent legislative changes in Massachusetts and California
have come about because officials found themselves charged with in-
spection duties without the administrative provision for carrying them
out.83 In view of the comparative stringency of provisions in these
states, it would seem that in most jurisdictions protection of the public
interest is far from assured.
Corporate dissolution is in most states a routine affair. There has
been some recognition of problems in the case of charitable corporations
holding trusts. New York, 4 Michigan, 5 Illinois,86 and California,8
for example, have statutes providing for such application. Yet the gen-
eral process is usually comparable to that of charter issuance-a matter
of board resolution and filing with the designated state official of the
appropriate forms. Although interim supervision during dissolution pro-
ceedings may be provided by the court, the stipulation that such approval
be a condition of voluntary dissolution is the exception. 8 The action of
the New York legislature in 1951 is a comment on enforcement. The
legislators added a new chapter to the Membership Law requiring all
corporations organized prior to January 1, 1948, to file a certificate of
existence, those failing to file being subject to dissolution by proclamation.
It would seem that even in a state in which the court, the secretary of
state, and a special departmental board was supposed to have some check
on charitable corporations there was some doubt as to the facts of corpo-
rate existence.
89
81 In re Nat. Foundation of Dramatic Arts, 62 D. and C. 343, 346 (Pa. 1947).
8211. Ann. Stat. c. 32, §163A49-64-97 and 98 (1954).
83 See footnote 47 supra for California; footnote 108, infra, for Massachusetts.
84 Membership Corp. Law, §55.
85 Mich. Stat. Ann., tit. 15, §21.168.
86 Smith-Hurd Ill. Stat. Ann., c. 32, §163A54.
87 Deering's Calif. Corp. Ann., §9801.
88 Revised Laws N. H. 1942, c. 272, §8-10.
89 See Leg. Committee Report, supra, note 54.
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In a number of states investigative functions have been assigned
to welfare boards. The New York Membership Corporations Law90
divides responsibility among those having supervisory powers over various
service programs, other states lodge them in the general board of wel-
fare or one of its divisions. Practically every jurisdiction required in-
vestigation of charter applications for proposed organizations in the child
welfare field. Massachusetts and South Carolina have had the most
explicit legislation of this kind, and developments in these two states are
indicative of trends. Massachusetts welfare offices sought such powers
as early as 1867, 9 gained them in 1901,92 further extended them in
1910." Early reports give detailed information about the investigations
carried on by the department. By 1927 the matter was becoming routine
and within the next ten years the practice had become that of listing
approved organizations and reporting the number of applications re-
fused. 4 A similar course is evident in the South Carolina reports. In
this state investigative functions were given to the board in 1920." 5 The
act was aimed at fund solicitation but required board endorsement of
all charitable corporations except the religious and eleemosynary institu-
tions specifically exempted. The South Carolina like the Massachusetts
reports show the same subordination of these functions to the demands
of service.
96
Under the most recent legislation the protection of charitable en-
dowments is now the duty of the attorney general in these two states.
Such recent changes as those in New York incidental to the creation of
a registry in the Department of Social Welfare grew out of charity
racketeering which threatened support for legitimate agencies. Legis-
lative assignment of certification to the welfare department is in an area
in which agencies have a practical stake and comes closer to their usual
licensing functions.
TAX EXEMPTIONS AND SUPERVISION
Both federal and state exemptions are important inducements to
philanthropic giving. There are almost as many variations in practice as
jurisdictions and the comparatively greater inducement offered through
federal exemption means that the state legislation is much less decisive.
However, local tax boards have had a role in charitable supervision in
passing on the claims of trusts and foundations. Suspicion of abuse may
lead to such action as reported on the part of the Wisconsin Tax Com-
missioner in exacting reports from all foundations.9 However excep-
90 N. Y. Membership Corp. Laws, §11.
91 Mass. Public Document No. 17, p. lxxiv, (1867).
52 Mass. Chapter 405 Acts of 1901.
93 Mass. Gen. Laws, Chapter 180, §12.
94 Note reports of State Department for years 1910-26 particularly. See
Kelso, The Science of Public W elfare, 83 (1928).
95 S. C. Act No. 448, Feb. 26, 1920.96 Taylor, supra, note 47, at 69.
97 Milwaukee Journal Nov. 15, 1945, and Feb. 14, 1946.
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tional the zeal of this official may be, it suggests the importance of tax
boards as a supervisory mechanism-and the peripheral question of the
extent to which tax officials may be exercising regulatory powers through
default by other supervisory groups.
At a time when the inflationary spiral winds upward, when indi-
vidual income taxes reach those at the subsistence level, and corporate
surtaxes and excess-profit taxes limit earnings, tax favors are enviously
if not cynically regarded. Even when an organization is devoted to a
bona fide charitable purpose, there are important socio-economic problems
involved in the tax favors granted charities. Such spectacular pyramiding
as that of the Little Trusts are probably less likely since the 1950 amend-
ments, but there is little question that the Ford Foundation, though active
in carrying out an educational and research program, enabled the Ford
family to continue a suzerainty over a great industry threatened by estate
and inheritance taxes.9
8
The ambivalence regarding charitable exemption is reflected in the
Cox Committee report which though advocating more stringent reporting
provisions also recommended that the Ways and Means Committee con-
sider modifying the tax structure to encourage contributions. 9 Founda-
tions are exempt under the provisions of Sec. 501(c)(3) of the 1954
Code. This section repeats the older Sec. 101(6) with the addition of
a new blessing extended to organizations "testing for public safety."
The classification also carries with it the familiar tests regarding the
conditions of exemption with a new specification regarding the in-
fluencing of legislation that the exempt organization does not participate
in, or intervene in (including the publishing or distributing of state-
ments) any political campaign on behalf of any candidate for public
office.
The inducements offered to individual and corporate tax payers are
quite considerable. The foundation is twice blessed; not only is its in-
vestment income exempt but contributions to it are not taxed. Individuals
may deduct as much as 30 per cent of their adjusted gross income though
the recently added ten per cent must go to regularly operated religious,
educational, or hospital organizations. Corporations are permitted ex-
emption of five per cent. Furthermore, there is neither gift tax nor
estate tax on property given or left to charity.
The changes in the substantive law made in 1950 aimed at certain
loopholes, especially those regarding "prohibited transactions" and "un-
reasonable accumulations." There are those who contend that far from
effecting the reforms intended, these provisions set a new standard for
98 For general discussion of tax regulation see, Eaton "Charitable Foundations
and Related Matters Under the 1950 Revenue Act" 37 Va. L. Rev. 253 (1951).
"The Modern Philanthropic Foundation: A Critique and Proposal," 59 Yale L. J.
477 (1950).
99 Select (Cox) Committee Final Report, 13.
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"reasonable management" and substitute the tax collector for the at-
torney general in trust enforcement. 1° °
Perhaps the basic problem in enforcement turns on Service incen-
tives in relation to expected revenue returns and the effectiveness of
procedures for review. Mr. Sugarman recently estimated that the In-
ternal Revenue Service was responsible for collecting "$70 billion a
year" an average of "a dollar every second for 2,250 years." This
astronomical sum comes from 70 different types of taxes ranging from
those on adulterated butter to those on giant corporations, and they are
reported on 800 different forms.10 ' The consequence to an organization
which has strayed from the exempt path is the loss of exemption for the
year in which the offense occurred and the loss to contributors of similar
tax favors. In view of the proportionate number of charitable organiza-
tions filing returns, there is question about the comparative value of
pursuit of possible evaders. Mr. Sugarman reported to the Reece Com-
mittee that only 55 organizations had had their exemption revoked
during the two year period ending June 1952.1"2
Recent revisions in reporting methods are revealing." 3 Section 153
in the 1951 Act added considerable detail to the financial reports exacted
from exempt organizations required to submit Form 990-A, provided
for segregating the file, and made most of the data on the balance sheet
available for public inspection. These changes were hailed as the be-
ginnings of a national registry and certainly provided more information
than the mere listing of the Treasury's Cumulative List. However, it
was soon apparent that the revolution in reporting was far from com-
plete. Investigators reported that getting the data from 64 scattered dis-
trict offices was troublesome and unrewarding. 1 4 Many files were not
segregated, and the reports themselves were sometimes incorrect or
illegible. The American Foundation Service began collecting the in-
formation as it became available, but this attempt at a national registry
was expensive and time consuming. The recently published American
Foundations and Their Fields appears already outdated." 5
The reorganization recently carried on within the Service makes
for certain streamlining in handling returns and most importantly the
latest revision of the reporting forms 990-A include some material cal-
culated to make a spot check much more revealing. Organizations are
asked such relevant questions as: "If you acquired capital assets out of
income, attach itemized list and amount thereof." "Have any changes
100 Comment, 21 U. Chi. L. Rev., 127 (1953).
101 Sugarman, Proceedings National Tax Association, 384 (1954).
102 Reece Committee Hearings, 461 (1954).
103 Bierman, "Relations with the Internal Revenue Service," Proceedings
New York University Second Biennial Conference, 25 (1955).
104Andrews, Philanthropic Foundations, 306 (1956); Bornet, California
Social Velfare, 138 (1956).
105 Bornet, op. cit. supra at 134.
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not previously reported to the Internal Revenue -Service been' made -in
your articles of incorporation or by.laws -or -other instrumints of similar
import?"
It would seem that if tax exempt organizations- are to be subjected
to more critical scrutiny, the treasury is. relying more on its 'field officers
than the general public.1 0 6 Although the" validity of public reporting is
rather generally conceded the practical fa'ct is that more direct means
seem essential if adequate accounting is to be exacted.
STATE TRENDS
Although legislative trends are subject to sudden reversals, the
direction in the past ten years has been increasingly towards implementing
the attorney general in carrying out his duties with regard to trust en-
forcement. Some states have only made explicit the common law duties
of the attorney general with regard to enforcement by spkcif3iing them
in the statutes. South Dakota 1 7 has recently passed a law detailing some
of his duties.
California and Massachusetts have most recently created a separate
division for the administration of charities under the attorney general.
The developments in Massachusetts are particularly interesting because
Attorney General Dever began investigating the situation in 1936."08
Reporting that in one county alone the unrestricted bequests for charity
alone equaled more than $26 million, and those restricted to charity
totaled $21 million during the period from 1915 to 1935, he asserted
that the attorney general was in no way able to identify existing trusts
nor was he equipped to carry out his presumed duties. His successor At-
torney General Bushnell repeated Dever's urgings, but the Judicial Coun-
cil not only refused to recommend the proposed Division of Charities but
warned that the scheme opened the door to bureaucratic powers "With
all the possible conceivable, and proverbial insolence of office which the
imagination of some future officials in the department might suggest."' 09
Possibly the documented experience in New Hampshire and Rhode
Island and general agreements by enforcement officials of the need for
such legislation had eased the fears in Massachusetts. In any event
Chapter 529 of the Acts of 1954 established such a division. The
provisions of this act are comparable to those in the New Hampshire
statute, and Ernest D'Amours who pioneered in setting up the registry
in his own state consulted with Massachusetts legislative groups in the
preparation of the present law.
The Massachusetts statute empowers the attorney general to ap-
point an assistant as Director of the Division. Under Sec. 8E all foreign
106 Baiter, Fraud Under Federal Tax Law, 60 (1953).
107 South Dakota Senate Bill No. 77, 34th Sess., Legislative Assembly, S. D.
(1955).
108 Details summarized in Mass. Public Doc. No. 12 reprinted 30 Mass. L. Q.
Rev. 22 (1945).
lO9 Id. at 42.
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charitable corporations with the exception of certain veteran groups must
file their charter :with the attorney general and report to his office.
Sec. 8F specifies that the trustees or governing board of "every public
charity" including those excepted in the preceding section shall file an
annual report. This report is to include:
the names and addresses of the trustees, or if the public charity
is an organization, the name and address of the organization
and the names and addresses of the members of its principal
governing board and of its principal officers, and if the organ-
ization is a corporation, the statute under which it was incorpo-
rated; the aggregate value of endowment and other funds,
the aggregate value of real estate, and the aggregate value of
tangible personal property held and administered by the public
charity for charitable, educational, benevolent, humane, or
philanthropic purposes or for other purposes of public charity,
all as shown by the books of the public charity at the end of
said fiscal year, and the aggregate income and the aggregate
expenditures of the public charity for such fiscal year; pro-
vided, however, that a public charity which annually furnishes
to interested persons or publishes a financial report containing
information as to endowment and other funds, real estate or
tangible personal property, income and expenditures required
by the preceding sentence, may file a copy of such financial
report for any year with the division as its report for such year
under this section as to the matters covered by said financial
report, and provided, further, that a public charity which is re-
quired by law to file accounts in a probate court of the
commonwealth may file a copy of such account for any year
with the division as its report for such year under this section
as to the matters covered by said account. This section shall
not apply to any property held for any religious purpose by
any public charity, incorporated or unincorporated. There shall
be a filing fee of three dollars for each such report, to be paid
to the division at the time of filing. In the event that any
public charity shall fail for two successive years to file a report
as required hereunder, the division may take such action as may
be appropriate to compel compliance with the provisions of
this section.
Important interrogatory powers include the right to examine books
and records and call witnesses "who shall be summoned in the same
manner and paid the same fees as witnesses in the superior court. Such
witnesses shall be duly sworn and shall give testimony under the pains
and penalties of perjury." (Sec. 8H) There is also the provision that
the attorney general be made a party in any proceeding affecting his
duties.
Assistant Attorney General Morton reports that it is too early as
yet to draw any conclusions about the new division, pointing out that
considerable time and labor has gone into the necessary transfer of
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reports previously filed with the Department of Public Welfare and
that the Division is in process of setting up procedures for handling;
reports. He adds, however:
It is already very clear that the combining of these re-
ports, together with the appearance of the Attorney General
in all probate proceedings affecting charities, has been a con-
structive step forward. As one would expect, it has taken some
time to educate trustees and charities as to the new regula-
tions, but the Division has had excellent cooperation from all
concerned. In the long run it may well be that one of the
chief values of the Division will be to provide a broad, practi-
cal and legal experience for lawyers and others who are
handling the affairs of charities to draw on. In the end, of
course, this will mean a better application of funds to public
charities."10
The Attorney General of California thinks it too early to comment
on the new legislation there. However, it is important to remember
that the attorney general in California had urged legislation to enable
him to carry out his enforcement duties.""' At the time such recom-
mendations were made, his office was specifically charged with inspection
of charitable corporations. The adoption of the Uniform Supervision of
Trustees for Charitable Purposes Act means a greater extension of duties.
Some hints as to the administrative involvements in setting up such ma-
chinery have been made clear by reports from Mr. D'Amours of the
two years necessary to set up the registry through assignment to a staff
member of the task of examining county records." 2 Indirect comment
on the California situation comes from Vaughan Bornet's review of the
state welfare system in which he reported that the attorney general was
still trying to identify the organizations covered by the Uniform Trustee
Act." 3 Mr. Bornet also reported his discovery that few organizations
in the Bay area seemed to think of themselves as charitable trusts or had
filled out appropriate forms.1
14
The Ohio legislation is discussed elsewhere in this symposium. In
general, the Ohio Act has not been as far reaching as that adopted in
New Hampshire and Rhode Island in the exemption of charitable, re-
ligious, and educational institutions holding funds for their own corporate
purpose and state or local agencies. Attorney General O'Neill's account
of the legislative process is illuminating-particularly the steps by which
bankers and probate judges became supporters of the measure." 5
110 Letter dated June 20, 1956.
11 Taylor, supra, note 47 at 46.
112 Reports of Attorney General of New Hampshire, 1944.
113 For extensive discussion of the implications of such an act, see Bogert,
supra, 56 at 650.
114 Bornet, op. cit. supra, note 105, at 133.
115 Bogert, supra, note 56, at 646.
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The South Carolina legislation adopted in 1953116 is the least in-
clusive of the statutes directed at improving trust enforcement. Trustees
are required to file a certified copy of the trust instrument within sixty
days after the establishment of the trust. Annual reporting calls for the
names and addresses of trustees, including corporate trustees, a complete
financial statement beginning with an inventory in the first filing and
successive annual balances. Trustees are also required to summarize their
general activities during the year. The attorney general is empowered to
make rules and regulations necessary for compliance. Exemptions are
more extensive than in other comparable legislation because in addition
to the exclusion of churches, church operated orphanages, hospitals, col-
leges or universities, and school districts, banking institutions under state
or federal banking supervision are exempt from reporting.
The two older statutes, those in Rhode Island and New Hampshire,
have been in effect long enough for some evaluation. The New Hamp-
shire legislation has been commented on in numerous reports and official
meetings.' Under the act now in effect" 8 a director is appointed by the
governor with the advice and consent of the council. The director has
the common law duties and powers of the attorney general in connection
with trust enforcement. He also is charged with preparation of a register,
which is open to the public, collecting reports and given broad investiga-
tory powers. These include examination of witnesses under oath and
access to any necessary documents or papers. Recalcitrant witnesses are
subject to a fine of $100. Probate registrars are also required to furnish
files and permit examination at the request of the attorney general. No
charitable trust shall be terminated unless the attorney general has been
given an opportunity to be heard.
Although the framers of the law wished to include charitable cor-
porations holding property in trust, neither the original act nor its re-
visions has extended to this group of charities. Nor are inter vivos
trusts subject to the act until actual vesting. Mr. D'Amours' reports on
the first years of operation point up the fact that though relatively little
outright abuses were discovered, there were many instances in which
trustees needed help in carrying out their duties. In his 1952 report
Mr. D'Amours calls attention to the wide range of services including
discovery of the unnecessary paying of taxes, help in speeding up settle-
ments, assistance in modifying restrictive trust terms, and in one in-
stance work with the Greek Consul to effectuate a scholarship gift to
the Greek community. In his most recent summary Mr. D'Amours
observes:
• . . we are pleased to report that the machinery established
for the supervision and enforcement of charitable trusts is
116 S. C. Laws, No. 274 (1953).
117 National Association Proceedings (1947-1953).
I 8 N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann. c. 7, §20-32 (1955).
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yielding increasing benefits for the people of the State. The
understanding and cooperation of trustees have been aug-
mented with each passing year. This supervision is no longer
looked upon as an unwelcome intrusion, but on the contrary
as a useful device for the protection of all parties concerned-
the donor, the trustee and the beneficiary."
9
The Rhode Island statute12 0 is similar to that adopted in New
Hampshire. There are some of the same exclusions: those accorded chari-
table and religious institutions holding funds for their own charter or
corporate purposes and charities not actually vested. The attorney general
is given powers to set up a register but there is no compulsory reporting
provision such as obtains in New Hampshire though failure to report for
a two year period is classified as a breach of trust. Reports are to include
identifying data and financial accounting. Probably because the statute
was passed shortly after the investigations into the Textron Trusts,
there is the specific provision that a trustee may not be excused from
reasonable care, diligence, and prudence by the terms of the instrument.
In 1955 Mr. Hoban, who now serves as Administrator of Charitable
Trusts under the remedial legislation adopted in 1950, reported that
four hundred and fifty three trusts having an appraised value of over
$60 million had been registered with the division. He was able to report
also that assets over $34 million were actually in the hands of bene-
ficiaries and the registry of another $28 million which will be vested
at some future time. 
121
PROPOSALS
Bogert in discussing the terms of the Model Act emphasizes the
variety of charitable organizations affected by such legislation and the
need for adaptation to the special circumstances of a given jurisdiction.1 22
The new state statutes illustrate the varieties possible. However, they all
try to solve the problem through supplying the attorney general with the
powers and the means for effecting court supervision. The exemption of
certain trusts from the provisions of these new acts seems to reflect the
accidents of the legislative process and the rationale is that of covering
the "danger areas."
Because the American foundations so often assume the corporate
form, it would seem advisable to give the inclusive definition to "Trus-
tee" suggested in the Uniform Act. The question of inter vivos trusts
and the nuisance value of registry prior to vesting has to be weighed
against the failure to identify such gifts. This is a policy question about
which there is considerable disagreement, but in view of the public con-
sequences of such a gift, it is arguable that there be some way of know-
ing when trustees assume duties for holding such a trust. The provision
119 N. H. Attorney General's Report for 1952-1954, 2.
120 R. L Laws 1950, c. 2617 as amended by Chapter 2852 of R. I. L. (1951).
121 Report of Administrator of Charitable Trusts, Jan. 1955.
122 Bogert, supra, note 56, at 650.
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that the attorney general be an indispensable party to suits would, of
course, increase the likelihood of identifying existing trusts. Bogert sug-
gests the possibility of requiring that filing for tax exemption include
registration of a charitable trust with the attorney general or the alterna-
tive of having the tax authorities supply the names and addresses of
trustees claiming exemption.'
23
The question of public policy and the role of various groups with
a legitimate interest in charitable supervision raise a vexing problem of
shared responsibility. Traditionally the responsibility for charitable super-
vision has been that of the courts and the reforms effected and urged
have been in the implementing of this legal machinery. In this con-
nection a proposed model draft drawn up by students in the Harvard
Legislative Research Bureau takes a somewhat different approach." 4
Although the writers warn of the unofficial nature of their draft and
its tentative character, some of their proposals are provocative enough
to review. In explaining the purposes of the act the draftsmen state:
1. It applies only to charitable trusts, as opposed to gifts upon
conditions to charitable corporations.
2. It requires registration of charitable trusts.
3. There is a Commission on Charitable Trusts whose pri-
mary duty it is, with the assistance of its general counsel
and secretariat, to bring before the appropriate state court,
when desirable, schemes for the new application of chari-
table trust funds.
4. When it appears that changing conditions require that a
scheme be applied, the procedure can be set in motion
either by the trustees or by the General Counsel of the
Commission. Hearings will be held, and ultimately, if the
Commission adopts a scheme, the General Counsel will
go before the appropriate court in the name of the Com-
mission to secure an order to put the scheme in effect.
5. Trustees who get no response or an unfavorable response
when they believe a scheme is desirable can get before the
courts directly. Trustees who believe there is a better
scheme than the Commission's can submit their schemes
in the alternative. And trustees who oppose any deviation
from the terms of the trust can contest the schemes
through the Commission's hearings and in the courts.
6. The ultimate determination of whether to order a scheme
or not and, if so, which, is in the hands of the courts. It is
presumed that great weight will be assigned to the Com-
mission's determinations although, of course, no formal
rules for judicial review are incorporated since the Com-
123 Id. at 656.
124 In giving permission to quote from this Model Act the writers emphasized
that it was in no way an official statement from Harvard University but is the
work of a student group.
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mission's role is that of plaintiff before the court rather
than that of an agency which has made a determination
binding upon any party.125
The suggestions of the Nathan Committee on the need to redefine
charitable purposes are apparent in the first section which sets out a
definition of charitable purposes as including "the relief of poverty, the
advancement of religion, the promotion of health, governmental or
municipal purposes, and other purposes the accomplishment of which is
beneficial to the community." Section 2 stipulating court powers pro-
vides for scheme-making with emphasis on liberalizing the cy pres doc-
trine. Schemes may be applied for when the trust instrument does not
provide for possible surplus funds or accumulation or combination when
they are insufficient. More importantly Sec. 2B provides:
When ordering a scheme, the court shall have regard for the
public interest particularly of the locality in which the charita-
ble trust was to have been applied originally, and special regard
for the spirit of the charitable intention of the donor, whether
the charitable intention was general or specific. Application
of funds 'as near as' possible to the original purpose shall be
desirable but shall not be the exclusive criterion.
The donor's wishes are to be regarded but not determinative and though
a condition of reverter may prevent application of the scheme, it would
be effective for only a 35-year period.
It is in the creation of a special commission that this proposed act
differs most from existing regulatory measures. The Commission is to be
group appointed by the governor with legislative consent (where this is
usual). Terms are to be staggered, and the chairmanship rotating. Mem-
bers are to be selected with due regard for "their standing and experience
in public, academic or charitable affairs." The commission seems to be
designed to act as a combination advisory and administrative group. The
powers are granted to it for drafting and approving schemes and recom-
mending them. Two staff members, a secretary, and a general counsel
are assigned to the commission though they, too, are to be appointed by
the governor. These two officials divide the duties usually assigned to
the attorney general in the states having trust registries. The secretary
has responsibility for setting up a registry, collecting reports, and making
recommendations to the commission regarding them. The general coun-
sel acts as an advisor to donors, trustees and named beneficiaries. It has the
usual investigative powers found in the Uniform Act and similar meas-
ures, but his duties with regard to helping in the scheme-making process
are more explicit. The drafters point out that their recommendations are
based on the idea that review of schemes can best be accomplished by a
group of citizens who are developing a growing body of experience.
The commission is also intended to relieve the attorney general of re-
125 Model Statute of Charitable Trusts, Draft #4, 14 and 15.
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sponsibility for overseeing charitable trusts, which they appear to regard
as having come about through historical accident rather than logic.'
2 6
In carrying over the suggestion of the Nathan Report regarding the
composition of the Commission, the proposed statute emphasizes the
British view that charities are of wide social concern and require the
collaboration of laymen as well as legal experts. 2 ' Although lay boards
have wide acceptance in the United States both in the case of social
agencies and the large operating foundations, the idea of a public Com-
mission with designated supervisory responsibilities over charitable trusts
would raise considerable debate. 2 ' In many quarters this might be re-
garded as usurping the administrative function of trustees.
The most discernable trend within the decade has been the growing
acceptance of the idea of the need for charitable supervision. Govern-
mental activity in this field has been stepped up markedly. Five states
have adopted specific measures to assure supervision. Ten others have
indicated that some measures like the Uniform Act have been under
consideration. Officials in a majority of states have expressed their con-
cern. Shifts in Federal reporting measures seem calculated to protect
charitable exemption more stringently.
At the same time that public officials have been assuming more
responsibility for duties with which they are charged, foundations them-
selves have urged consistent voluntary reporting and collaboration with
governmental review. The Cox hearings brought out the general ac-
ceptance by the larger foundations of their identity as public trusts.
The phrase "glass-pockets" to describe the appropriate foundation garb
has become a kind of by-word in discussion of the subject. The most
important recent development has been the establishment of the Founda-
tion Library Centre under the direction of F. Emerson Andrews. As
the New York Times editorial 130 pointed out Mr. Andrews is recognized
as perhaps the best informed person in the country on foundations and
their operations. He has also been one of the most consistent advocates
of public accountability, including the creation of a registry, compulsory
annual reporting, and provision for regular review by a public authority
with power to correct abuses.' 3 '
The Foundation Library Centre was set up under an initial grant
from the Carnegie Corporation as an education institution under the
Board of Regents of the University of the State of New York. Its
charter statement sets out its purpose "to collect, organize, and make
available to the public reports and information about foundations."' 32
12 Id., §§3-5.
127 Nathan Report, 95.
128 See, supra, note 108. Also note the discussion of attitudes of foundations
themselves regarding a central organization. Andrews, supra, note 29, at 340.
129 Cox Select Comm., supra, note 99, at 13.
13o N. Y. Times Editorial, Dec. 18, 1956.
131 Hearings Select Cox Comm., supra, note 37, at 48, 84.
132 Prospectus, 1.
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Since the organization was officially opened during the week of Decem-
ber 18, 1956 its prospectus is the chief basis for anticipating its activities.
The Centre received as a gift or depository loan, all the related material
that the Russell Sage Foundation has been accumulating since 1915.
"t has secured photographic transcripts of financial and other data on
some seven thousand organizations of the foundation type. It is cur-
rently accumulating information from individual foundations . . .Future
plans include assembling of recent financial data from the office of the
Internal Revenue Service and preparation of a directory."13 The im-
portant difference between this and any preceding venture is not only
the sheer amount of information that is to be made publicly available but
the stimulus to reporting and to research. The Centre is to provide an
interneship in philanthropy to a person nominated by a foundation. There
is potential here not only for staff training but for basic research in the
whole field of philanthropy.
The recent developments go far towards solving some of the prob-
lems that have been pointed up in the field. Yet many of these are the
complex ones for which there is no Univac answer. One of the prob-
lems in philanthropy, like that in other areas is for adequate channels of
communication between interested persons in the field. What may be-
come a new issue is how to determine the role of various citizen and
professional groups. This problem will inevitably face lawyers, legis-
lators, donors, trustees, and beneficiaries who share alike responsibility for
stewardship.
133 Id., 2.
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